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This paper assesses the performance ofus. exports in
the later part ofthe 1980s and finds that it cannot befully
explained by key variables that are generally believed
to determine the demand for us. exports: the nominal
trade-weighteddollar, relative inflation, andforeign GNP
growth.
The unexpectedly robust performance ofus. exports
partly reflects improvements in thecompetitivenessofus.
exporters that are not capturedby the trends in inflation in
the us. and abroad. 1n particular, US. export price
increases in the 1980sfell below the rate ofinflation in the
US., apparently as a result of a change in the pricing
behavior ofus. exporters.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Formuch of the 1980s, there was widespread pessimism
about the outlook for US. exports. US. exports declined
overthe period 1980-85. Given the widespreadperception
of lagging productivity growth and a lack of competitive-
ness in U.S. manufacturing,' dramatic improvements in
US. export performance were not expected.
As a result, the robust performance of U.S. exports at
the end of the last decade surprised a number of observers.
Real US. exports of goods and services grew at a com-
pound annual rate of 12.5 percent between 1985-89,well
above the 8.1percent averagegrowth of the 1970s. Further-
more, the growth in exports was not confined to the period
of dollar depreciation between 1985 and 1987. Exports
grew nearly 14 percent in 1988, and 10 percent in 1989,
even as the dollar appreciated between early 1988 and the
third quarter of 1989.
This paper assesses the performance of U.S. exports up
to 1989 and finds that it cannot be fully explained by key
variables that are generally believed to determine the
demand for US. exports: the nominal trade-weighted
dollar, relative inflation, and foreign GNP growth. Three
possible explanations for the tendency to underpredict
exports are examined. First, exports of services may have
grown unusually fast in relation to exports of goods.
Second, recent efforts by Japan, Taiwan and South Korea
to increase access to their markets have contributed to an
increase in US. exports to these economies that is not
captured by the standard determinants of export demand.
Third, there has been atendency tounderstate thecompeti-
tiveness of US. exporters, because of changes in their
pricing behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the
determinants of US. export demand and assesses their
ability to predict exports in recent years. Section II eval-
uates therole of services exports in explaining thebehavior
of total exports. Section III examines whether recent
efforts by rapidly growing Asian economies to liberalize
imports mayhavecontributedto the inabilitytoexplain the
growth in US. exports. Section IV discusses the possibil-
ity that pricing behavior in the US. export sector mayhave
changed, and Section V examines the implications of the
pattern of export pricing for US. competitiveness and
the ability to predict exports. Section VI offers some
conclusions.
39The error-correction specification used in equation (1)
has three desirable features: (1) it avoidsthe possibility of
spurious correlation among strongly trended variables; (2)
long-run relationships which may be lostby expressing the
data in differences are captured by including the lagged
levels of the variables on the right hand side; and (3) the
specification can distinguish between short-run (first dif-
ferences) and long-run (lagged levels) effects.
To test the ability of competitiveness and demand fac-
tors to explain recent export behavior, equation (1) was
estimated from 1972:4 through 1987:4 and an out-of-
sample simulation was performed for the period 1988:1 to
1989:4. The sample was broken in 1987:4 because the
dollar reached its most recent trough in that quarter.? The
coefficients and summary statistics from the estimation of
equation (1) are reported in a later section. Wefocus onthe
(1)
= real exports of goods and services, NIPA
basis NXR xp
= real exchange rate = TWFC;/




I. The Determinants of U.S. Exports
Two main factors are generally believed to determine NXR = Nominal trade-weighted dollar
the change in the demand for U.S. exports: the competi- Pus = U.S. fixed-weight GNP price index
tiveness of U.S. exporters, which is influenced by the TWFCPl = trade-weighted CPI of 10-major industrial
U.S. dollar and relative inflation rates, and the overall countries
demand for goods abroad, which is influencedby the GNP FGNP = trade-weighted GNP of 10 major industrial
growth of major U.S. trading partners. Table 1 shows the countries
behavior of these determinants of export demand in the
1970s and 1980s.
Table 1suggests that in the first half of the 1980s, U.S.
export growth was limited by the sharp appreciation of the
dollar and a slowdown in foreign GNP growth in com-
parison to the 1970s. These trends were largely reversedin
the second half of the 1980s. In particular, the growth of
U.S. exports in recent years appears to be partly the result
of the lagged effects of the depreciation of the dollar
between 1985 and 1987 and of an acceleration in the
growth of U.S. trading partners since 1985. Itmayalso be
noted that in the first half of the 1980s, U.S. inflation
remained on average below foreign inflation, contributing
to U.S. export competitiveness. In contrast, an accelera-
tion in U.S. inflation above inflation abroad adversely
affected the competitiveness of U.S. exporters in the
second half of the 1980s.
While Table 1 highlights some of the factors that may
have contributed to recent U.S. export performance, it
cannot tell us whether these factors fully account for
recent export growth. Toshed some light on this question,
the demand for U.S. exports of goods and services was
modeled as a function of the exchange rate-adjusted ratio
of U.S. to foreign prices, or the real exchange rate (as a
proxy for U.S. competitiveness) and to foreign GNP (as a
proxy for foreign demand). This model of export volume
was expressed in log first-difference form, with the (one
quarter) lagged levelsof the explanatory variables and the
respective dependent variables on the right-hand side of
each equation. This representation, also known as an
"error-correction" specification, is shown in equation (1):
m m
JiXGS = ex + .L 13i MXR1 t-i + .L "Ii MGNPt _ i 1=0 1=0
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results of the simulation here. Chart1, which compares the
path of actual and predicted exports, shows that the export
equation did not fully anticipate the robust performance of
the U.S. export sector in 1988 and 1989. Over that period,
there was a systematic and growing underprediction of the
level of real exports of goods and services, so that by
1989, the out-of-sample forecast was outside the 95 per-
cent confidence range. Thus, factors other than changes in
the dollar, relative inflation, and growth abroad appear
to have contributed to export growth in the latter part of
the 1980s.3
Three explanations may be offered for the tendency of
equation (1) to underpredict exports of goods and services
over that period. First, exports of services, which are
included in the left-hand-side of equation (1), may have
grown faster than expected in response to variables (such
as rising interestrates abroad) otherthan the real exchange
rate and foreign GNP.
Second, recent efforts by Japan, Taiwan and South
Korea to increase access to their markets have contributed
to an increase in U.S. exports to these economies. As a
result, the coefficients on foreign GNP in equation (1) may
be unstable.
Third, the improved competitiveness of U.S. exporters
may not have been fully reflected in movements in the
dollar or in U.S. inflation, which are the basis for the
competitiveness measure used in equation (1).
Exports of Services, Not ljoomu
A possible explanation for the underprediction of ex-
ports towards the end of the 1980s is that in Section I, a
single export equation is used to forecast exports of both
goods and services. Since factor incomes or services may
respond to variables other than the real exchange rate and
foreign GNP (notably foreign interestrates), their behavior
may account for the underprediction of total exports. The
plausibility of this hypothesis may be examined in two
ways. First, if exports ofservices explain the underpredic-
tion observed in Chart 1they must have grown unusually
fast in comparison to merchandise exports. Second, if
exports of services contributed to the underprediction of
total exports, the out-of-sample forecast of exports should
improve when services are excluded.
To check the first possibility, Table 2 compares the
growth in the components of real exports of goods and
services. Table 2 shows that U.S. merchandise exports
grew faster than U.S. exports of services in the 1980s,
reversing the patternof the 1970s, when exportsofservices
grew faster. (As a result, the real share of U.S. merchan-
dise exports in total exports, which had fallen from nearly
68 percent in 1970 to 62 percent in 1980, rose to nearly 66
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percent in 1989.) Thus, Table 2 does not support the
hypothesis that unusually rapid growth in services ac-
counts for the remarkable growth in exports at the end of
the 1980s.4
To check the second possibility, equation (1) was re-
estimated respectively using (i) exports of goods and
services net of factor income and (ii) exports of goods as
the dependent variable. Inspection of the errors, illustrated
in Chart 2, indicates that the systematic and rising tend-
ency to underpredict exports still occurs when factor
incomes or services are excluded. Thus, the underpredic-
tion of exports does not appear to be the result of any
unusual pattern in exports of services. In the discussion
that follows, we will therefore continue to focus on total
exports of goods and services.
III. Growing Accessto Foreign Markets
In the 1980s, a number of highly successful Asian Taiwan's trade liberalization efforts have been even more
economies sought to liberalize their commercial policies extensive. In early 1989, 98 percent of the products could
and improve access to theirdomestic markets. The cases of be freely imported. Average tariff rates, which had re-
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have drawn particular mained at around 31 percent from 1980 to 1984 fell to
attention, as all three economies experienced large trade around20 percentin 1987and to 6.3percentin 1989. Tariff
surpluses over extendedperiods in the 1980s. In the case of rates are to fall to 3.5 percent by 1993.
Japan, where tariffs are low, and formal nontariff barriers
are quite limited, efforts have focused on eliminating
impediments to agricultural imports (for example, by
eliminating prohibitions on beef and citrus imports), and
lifting so-called "intangible" barriers to trade that have
tended to discourage imports. In the cases of Taiwan and
South Korea, steps have been taken to eliminate nontariff
barriers or to replace them by tariffbarriers (thus enhanc-
ing the transparency of protection, which facilitates trade),
and also to lower tariff barriers.
For example, South Korea increased the percentage of
goods approvedfor importlicensesfrom 64 percentin 1978
to 95 percent by the late 1980s. It also adopted a plan to
reduce average tariffrates progressively. Tariffs havefallen
from an average of nearly 24 percent in 1983 to 19percent
in 1987 and to under 13 percent in 1989. Assuming no
reversals, they are projected to fall to 7 percent by 1993.
42 Economic Review / Winter 1991These efforts by major Asian economies to improve
access to their markets appear to have benefited U.S.
exporters. U.S. nominal exports toJapan, South Koreaand
Taiwan grew at an unprecedented rate in the later part of
the 1980s. As shown in Table 3, annual U.S. exportgrowth
between 1987 and 1989respectively averaged 26 percent to
Japan, 53 percent to Taiwan and 29 percent to Korea. This
is well above historical averages. While real bilateral
export data are not available, it is likely that real export
growth follows a similarpattern. The rapid growth of U.S.
exports to these economies implies that they accounted for
a significant proportion of total U.S. export growth in the
later ofthe 1980s.
If the acceleration of U.S. exports to Japan, Taiwanand
South Korea is due to their efforts to improve access to
their economies, theexplanatory power of equation may
be adversely affected. In particular, it may be argued that
greater openness in these markets will tend to increase the
responsiveness of the demand for U.S. exports to foreign
GNP. To investigate this possibility, equation (1) was
estimatedover the period 1972-1989, with slope dummies
for the foreign GNP variable beginning in 1988:1. The
results are summarized in Table 4. Itis apparent that there
has been no statistically significant change in the response
ofexports to foreign GNP. Thus, a largermarginal propen-
sity to import abroad does not explain the underprediction
of U.S. exports over the past two years.
IV. Change Exporter Pricing Behavior?
(3)
(2)
Another possible explanation for the tendency to under-
predict exports at the end of the 1980s is that the improve-
ments in the competitiveness of U.S. exporters may not be
fully reflected in the measure of competitiveness used in
equation (1). The competitiveness of U.S. exporters may
be measuredin two different ways. One approach isto take
the exchange rate-adjusted ratio of a domestic U.S. price
(such as the U.S. fixed-weight GNP price) and trade-
weighted prices (such as foreign CPIs).5 In this
case we obtainthe measure of U.S. competitiveness, or the
real exchange rate, used in estimating equation (1):
NXRXPus
RXRl = TWFCPl
where an increase in RXRj corresponds to a real appre-
ciation, or a decline in external competitiveness. An
alternative approach is to construct an exchange rate-
adjustedindex ofthe price of U.S. exports relative totrade-
weighted foreign prices, that is:
NXRxPX
TWFCPl
where PX is the (fixed-weight) export deflator.
AlthoughRXR2 is amore direct measure ofthe competi-
tiveness of U.S. exporters, RXRj , which is based on a
domestic U.S. price, is often used as a proxy for U.S.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
competitiveness for a number of reasons. First,
reflects the overall competitiveness of all goods produced
in the U.S. rather than of the goods that are currently
produced in the export sector. A broad measure of U.s.
competitiveness, such as RXRj , accounts for the
bility that if domestic prices are sufficiently competi-
tive, certain U.S. producers may begin for the
U.S. export sector even if they do not do so currently.
RXR2 , which is based on the export of current
exporters, does not explicitly take this possibility into
account. Second, RXR j reflects the plausible view that in
the long run, the competitiveness of U.S. exporters will
largely be determined by domestic costs of production, as
represented a U.S. the use of
RXRj is consistent with the traditional conventional wis-
dom regarding the market conditions that face U.S. expor-
ters." According to this view, substitutes for
in world markets historically were not readily available and
exports had a limited impact on total profitability. As a
result, U.S. exporters were relatively less concerned about
their external competitiveness, and export prices were set
primarily on the basis of domestic costs of production,
rather than on conditions prevailing in export markets. In
this environment, there would be a stable relationship
between the U.S. export price (used in RXR 2) and the
fixed-weight GNP price (used in RXR j ) , and the two
43measures RXRj and RXR2 would give the same overall
picture of competitiveness. The GNP price in RXRj can
then be interpreted as a proxy for the export price that is
used directly in RXR2 .
However, RXRj will give a misleading picture of the
competitiveness of US. exporters if the relationship be-
tween the export price and the fixed-weight GNP price is
not stable because of a change in the pricing behavior of
exporters.
To assess whether the relationship appears to be stable,
Chart 3 shows the ratio of these two prices between 1970
and 1989. I call this ratio the relative export price. As can
be seenfrom equations (2) and (3) the relative export price
is equivalentto dividingRXR2 byRXRj , and thus indicates
whether the two measures of competitiveness behave in a
similar way. If in the ratio is flat, and RXR2
give the same measure of competitiveness. If the ratio
declines, exporters are more competitive than suggested
by RXRj ; the reverse is true if the ratio rises. As a
reference, the chart also shows the path of the nominal
trade-weighted dollar.
The interpretation of Chart 3 is facilitated if we think of
the relative export price as an indicator of the aggregate
profit margin ofthe export sector.7 The chart suggests that
there was no trend in export profit margins in the 1970s, as
there was little net change in the relative export price
betweenthe early and late 1970s. Incontrast, apronounced
decline in the relative export price occurred between 1980
and 1985, and was not reversed subsequently.8
The decline in the relative export price in the early 1980s
may have been partly the result of a contraction in world
economic activity that reduced demand for US. exports
and thus prompted a (cyclical) reduction in US. export
prices. An alternative explanation, which we focus on
here, is that US. producers may have been attempting to
price more competitively in US. export markets. This
explanation is suggested by the fact that a lower relative
export price persisted after world economic activity re-
covered in 1983 and particularly after the dollar deprecia-
tion between 1985 and 1987 sharply reduced the foreign
currency price of US. exports.
Such a change in pricing behavior would be consistent
with growing competitive pressures caused by the entry of
producers from Japan, and later the newly industrializing
Asian economies in world markets previously dominated
by US. producers, such as capital goods and electronics,
beginning in the 1970s. These pressures probably
sified in the 1980s because the sharp appreciation of the
dollar (see Chart 3) in the first halfofthe 1980s increased
the price ofU.S. products in foreign currencies, paving the
wayfor further entry by Asian producers in US. and world
markets. Furthermore, the debt crisis that began in 1982
led to stagnation in traditional US. exports of manufac-
tures to Latin America, which required US. producers to
seek out new markets.
Testingfor Stability in Export Pricing
The discussion in the preceding section raises the ques-
tion of whether the decline in the US. relative export price
can be detected as a change in exporter pricing behavior.
We may attempt to test more formally for such a change
and attempt to identify the sources of any such change at
the aggregate level, by using a model of export pricing.
Following the literature on this subject, assume that in
setting the prices of traded goods, suppliers add a markup
over their costs of production. The markup is in turn a
function of competing goods prices, which are influenced
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44 Economic Review ! Winter 1991can then be expressed as a function of the domestic GNP
price (to represent domestic costs of production), and the
exchange rate-adjusted foreign price (to represent foreign
competition). In error-correction form, this relationship
may be expressed as follows:
m m TWFCPI





In the long run the export price will tend to rise in
response to an increase in the domestic GNP price, which
raises the costs of production. The export price will also
tend to rise in response to an increase in theforeign priceor
a dollar depreciation, to the extent that U.S. producers
respond to export market conditions in setting the export
price.? The long-run coefficients in equation (4) (based on
'TI' 'T2) are thus expected to be positive. The signs on the
short-run coefficients (f.Li' Vi' ~j) depend on the precise
pattern of adjustment.
To verify whether the response of export prices to its
determinants has changed, equation (4) was estimated
between 1972:1 and 1985:1, and the equation was simu-
lated out-of-sample from 1985:2 to 1989:4. The sample
was broken in 1985:1, when the U.S. dollar peaked,
because in the period that followed, cyclical and exchange
rate factors would tend to put upward pressure on U.S.
export prices. A moderate export price response to these
upward pressures, as indicated by asystematic tendency to
overpredict export prices after 1985:1, would thus suggest
more competitive pricing behavior on the part of U.S.
exporters.
The results of the regression are reported in column I of
Table 5. As can be seen, equation (4) produces a satis-
factory fitand the hypothesis that there is no serial correla-
tion cannot be rejected. In line with conventional wisdom,
the results suggest that U.S. exporters priced
mainly on the basis of domestic costs of production, and
ignored the exchange rate-adjusted foreign price up to the
first half of the 1980s.
Chart 4 illustrates the results of the simulation from
1985:2 to 1989:4. As can be seen, there was a tendency to
overpredict the export price in the second half of the1980s,
which supports the view that exporters were pricing more
competitively.
Toidentify the sources ofthis apparent change inpricing
behavior, equation (4) was re-estimated over the period
1974:4-1989:4. Several regressions were then performed,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 45the long-run response to U.S. and to the
of the dependent variable may have changed. However,
was difficult to isolate the precise nature of the \A1<U1i:S"".
The slope dummy coefficients onthe and changes
of the U.S. GNP and the exchange rate-adjusted
foreign price were not 1 and 2
above). The results of the are
not because are very similar to the results
shown in column II.
However, there is some weak evidence that the rate at
which exporters adjust their in response to
deviations from the desired
of may have As shown in column
III ofTable 5 the coefficient on the slope variable
for the lagged level ofthe variable 3
is at the 10 percent
To sum up, the U.S. export fell in to
the GNP price as the dollar appreciated in the 1980s.
This relative decline persisted even after the dollar appre-
ciation was fully reversed over the period 1985-1987.
decline in the relative export appears to reflect a
change in the pricing behaviorofexporters, but the nr,,',,"'"
nature of the change was not easy to identify or interpret.
Further research is required to clarify the process govern-
ing the pricing behavior U.S. . In "",rri,.,., I",.
studies of export pricing at the level may be
necessary, as recent research of the U.S.
suggests that aggregationproblems may
model aggregate pricing 12
with slope dummy variables for the period 1985:2-1989:4
on the following variables:
1) the first differences of the domestic U.S. price, the
exchange-rate adjusted foreign price, and the lagged
dependent variable;
2) the lagged levels of the domestic U.S. price and the
exchange-rate adjusted foreign price, with and without
a slope dummy on the lagged dependent variable; and
3) the lagged level ofthe dependent variable only.
A negative slope dummy coefficient on the domestic
U.S. price variable would suggest that exporters were
adjusting theirexport prices by less in response to changes
in their costs of production, which would be consistent
with growing competitive pressures.10
A positive slope dummy coefficient on the foreign
variable would suggest that U.S. exporters were respond-
ing to external competitive pressures after 1985, whereas
they had not done so in the past. 11
A change in the response to the lagged dependent
variable is more difficult to interpret. However, a negative
coefficient on the slope dummy indicates that the increase
in the U.S. export price associated with its past value has
fallen, which is consistent with more moderation in the
pricing behavior of U.S. exporters or a change in the
desired level ofU.S. export prices.
ColumnIIin Table 5 reports the results ofthe regression
over the period 1972:4-1989:4 without any slope dummy
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'Expressed in foreign currency by multiplying with the Federal Reserve Board's
nominal trade-weighted index of the dollar.
Competitiveness and Export Performance
end of the 1980s were better positioned to face foreign
competitionthan they had beenat any othertime during the
preceding twenty years.
Afterrising in the first halfof the 1980s, the U.S. export
price in foreign currency fell sharply in 1985. Even though
the drop in the U.S. export price was reversed starting in
1988, the level of the export price was still below the level
of the trade-weighted foreign CPI in 1989. Of course,
comparisons of indices can be sensitive to the choice of
base period (Chart 5 uses 1980 as the base year), but the
conclusionthat U.S. exporters are still competitiverelative
to their trading partners is fairly robust; any base year
between 1970 and 1985 yields the same conclusion.13
Chart 5 suggests that the post-1985 increase in U.S.
inflation relative to inflation abroad (recallTable 1)was not
for exchange
The preceding discussion suggests that a measure of
U.S. basedon the exportprice may give a
markedly different picture of U.S. competitiveness than
does a measure based on the U.S. GNP This can be
seen in Chart5, which compares the respectivepaths of the
U.S. GNP and the U.S. export price, both in foreign
currency, to the trade-weightedforeign Cl'I over the period
Note that fluctuations in the U.S. GNP price
price now reflect changes in the dollar
measure suggests that after adjust-
U.S. inflation on average exceeded
foreign inttauon, so that U.S. exporters were still relatively
uncompetitive at the end of the 1980s. In contrast, the
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 47fully reflected in export prices. As a result, the measure of
competitiveness based on the U.S. GNP price (RXR1) used
in equation (1) tends to understate U.S. competitiveness,
while RXR2 may give a more realistic picture of U.S.
competitiveness in the 1980s. Changes in U.S. competi-
tiveness not captured by RXR1 may thus explain the
tendency for equation (1) to underpredict U.S. exports.
Toverifythis last hypothesis, equation (1) wasestimated
over the period 1972:4-1987:4, replacing RXR1 by RXR2 .
An out-of-sample dynamic simulation was then performed
for the period 1988:1-1989:4.
Table 6 compares the results of the regressions using
RXR1and RXR2 while Table 7 compares the out-of-sample
forecasting performance over the period 1988:1-1989:4.
Taken together thetables showthat the in-sample perform-
ance of either measure of competitiveness over the period
1972:4-1987:4 is roughly comparable. However, when
RXR2 is used, the mean square error of the out-of-sample
forecast inthe last twoyearsofthe 1980sfallsby60 percent
in comparison to the forecast using RXRI: Furthermore,
Chart 6 shows that using RXR2 eliminates the systematic
underprediction of U.S. exports after 1988, and that the
path of actual exports now tends to remain within the 95
percent confidence band of the forecast. 14
The ability of RXR2 to improve the forecast of exports,
in comparison to the forecast based onRXRl' suggests that
the rapid growth in exports towards the end of the 1980s
was partly the result of changes in the competitiveness
ofU.S. exporters. This change in competitiveness was in
tum apparently attributable to changes in their pricing
behavior.15
48 Economic Review I Winter 1991VI. Conclusion
The rapid growth of U.S. exports of goods and services
in 1988and 1989is notfully explained by a standard model
of export demand that accounts for trends in the dollar,
relative inflation rates in the U.S. and abroad and robust
growth among U.S. trading partners. U.S. exports grew
rapidly in 1988 and 1989 in spite of an appreciating dollar
and an increase in U.S. inflation in comparison to inflation
abroad.
The unexpectedly robust performance of U.S. exports
partly reflects improvements in the competitiveness of
U.S. are not captured by the in
intlation in the U.S. and abroad. In the 1980s, U.S. export
prices increased by less than inflation in the U.S. or (after
adjusting for exchange rates) in major foreign industrial
countries. Thus, the relative rate of U.S. inflation has
tended tounderstate thecompetitivenessoftheU.S. export
sector. The empirical tests reported in this paper suggest
that the deviation between export price increases and U.S.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
inflation in the 1980s may in tum have been caused by a
change in pricing behavior on the part of U.S. exporters.
However, further research at the industry level is required
to confirm this hypothesis.
The findings of this paper underscore the fragility of the
boom in U.S. exports that began in the late 1980s. While
the relative slowdown in the rise of the U.S. export price
offset the adverse impact of rising U.S. inflation on U.S.
competitiveness, this offset cannot persist indefinitely.
Export price increases can remain below the U.S. rate of
inflation in the run if the of the
export sector consistently exceeds productivity
the U.S. domestic sector. There appears to be no evidence
that this is occurring, and in the absence of further U.S.
dollar depreciation, continued gains in U.S. competitive-
ness will require a reduction in U.S. inflation below the
rate of inflation of its trading partners.
49NOTES
1. For a recent discussion of the poor productivity per-
formance of the U.S. manufacturing sector and the pos-
sible contribution of lagging innovation, see Baily and
Chakrabarti (1988). A more optimistic interpretation of
trends in U.S. productivity isoffered by Baumol, Blackman
and Wolff (1989).
2. Furthermore, the discussion of Chart 5 later in the
text suggests that in contrast to previous episodes of dol-
lar appreciation, U.S. exporters remained competitive in
comparison to foreign producers during the dollar appre-
ciation of 1988-89, Out-of-sample simulations of equation
(1) for the period 1985:1-1989:4 also suggest that there
was no systematic tendency to underpredict until 1988,
These out-of-sample simulations were performed after the
break-point was selected.
3. A similar conclusion is reached when the simulations
are based on the export equation of the structural model of
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which uses a
quadratic POL specification. See Throop (1989). A POL
specification is also used in the export equations of the
MPS model of the U.S.economy maintained by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
4. The nominal data convey a different impression. While
the growth of merchandise and services exports were
roughly the same in the 1970s, in the 1980s, the value of
services exports grew more rapidly than did the value
of merchandise exports. As a result, the nominal share of
services in U.S. exports grew from 35 percent in 1970 to
36 percent in 1980 and to 41 percent in 1989. This ris-
ing share reflects the more rapid rate of inflation in the
services sector.
5. This approach is followed in the FRBSF structural
model aswell as the Federal Reserve Board's MPSmodel.
The latter model uses the nonfarm business fixed-weight
deflator net of indirect business taxes, in lieu of the export
price, in measuring the competitiveness of the U.S export
sector. See Brayton and Mauskopf (1985), Section VII. In
contrast, the Board's MCM model uses the export price in
measuring U.S. export competitiveness, as in equation
(3). See Helkie and Hooper (1988), Table 2-3.
6. These market conditions are discussed in Hooper and
Mann (1987).Another reason the use of RXR1 isappealing
is that it eliminates the need to estimate an export price
separately same is true on the side). This can
be useful in forecasting, particularly since specifying a
stable price equation can be difficult.
7. For related measures see Hooper and Mann (1987)
and Moreno (1989b),
8. Note that there also seems to be a decline in the
relative export price if other price indices are used. See
Moreno (1989b), which compares the nonagricultural ex-
port price to the PPI. A comparison of export unit values
and the PPIyields a similar conclusion, although itmay be
argued that this may reflect a shift in the composition of
exports towards high-productivity and low-price sectors,
such as computers.
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9. For an analogous equation, see the export equation of
the Federal Reserve Board's Multicountry Model (MCM),
described in Helkie and Hooper (1988). However, Helkie
and Hooper use the non-agricultural export price on the
left-hand-side and a specially constructed price index to
represent domestic costs of production on the right-hand-
side. Note that as in Helkie and Hooper, equation (4)
assumes that exporters respond in exactly the same way
to changes inthe exchange ratethat they do to changes in
the foreign price, on the assumption that the response to
changes in the exchange rate is motivated purely by the
effect it may have on competitiveness in foreign markets.
10. One possible interpretation of such a result is that
increases in productivity inthe exportsector have recently
exceeded increases in overall U.S, productivity, and that
exporters are passing on these gains to their customers,
An informal examination of some of the industry data
provides no clear indication of whether productivity gains
among exporters in the 1980s have in fact exceeded
productivity gains for U.S. producers as a whole. For
example, in the capital goods industry-one of the most
dynamic U.S. export sectors-labor productivity growth
in the 1980s in semiconductors, computers and non-
electrical machinery-exceeded the growth of labor pro-
ductivity in manufacturing as a whole, On the other hand,
labor productivity growth was below average in a number
of historically important U.S. export sectors, such as con-
struction machinery, ball bearings, machine tools and
pump and compressors. For a more detailed discussion,
see Orr (1989).
11. Using data at the four-digit SIC level, Hooper and
Mann (1987) found some indications that U,S. producers
tend to price more competitively relative to foreign pro-
ducers in industries where exposure to export markets is
rising or where there is strong competition for market
share because close substitutes for U,S. products are
available abroad (for example, in semiconductors)
12. See Melick (1990). Melick has performed a battery of
econometric tests to characterize U,S. import pricing
behavior. His results highlight the difficulties that arise
when using aggregate data to model pricing behavior,
Econometric tests rejected the restrictions suggested by
three widely used models of import pricing behavior: (i)
perfect competition; (ii) Nash imperfect competition; (iii)
the mark-up model (as in Hooper and Mann (1989)).
Melick attributes this rejection to aggregation problems,
In particular, all three types of market structure may
be present at the aggregate level. Other tests suggested
that the widely used POL specification with correction for
serial correlation may produce spurious instability, but
appropriate alternative specifications are not obvious.
Additional tests using similar recursive econometric tech-
niques may verify whether the apparent instability in ex-
port pricing behavior suggested by Chart 4 is robust to
changes in specification and clarify its sources,
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reader should recall that the trade-weighted foreign CPI
measure covers only major industrial countries. A meas-
ure that includes the CPls of a number of developing
countries-notablythe Asian newly industrializing econo-
mies-might indicate a less robust improvement in the
competitiveness of U.S. exporters. However, it would still
betrue that U.S.exporters are morecompetitive in relation
to their industrial country trading partners.
14. Similarresults are obtained when using aPDLspecifi-
cation for the export equation, as in the FRBSF structural
model. One issue that has not been directly addressed in
the paper is whether the single equation estimation tech-
niques used here-which are commonly used in the
literature-may account for the tendency to underpredict
export volume observed in Chart 1.Since single equation
estimates are correct ifthe elasticity of supply is infinite(or
the demand function is stable while the supply function
shifts around), one way of justifying the use of single
equation techniques is to note that the U.S. domestic
production sector isvery large incomparison to theexport
sector, and that supply can therefore shift to the export
sector quite easily.
Furthermore, it does not appear that simultaneous
equation bias would produce the underprediction of ex-
ports obtained in this paper. As pointed out by Goldstein
and Khan (1985), single equation estimates can produce
weighted averages of demand and supply elasticities and
may therefore be biased downward. Consider now the
demand function estimated in Table 6. Assuming this
function was stable over the period 1988-1989, the U.S.
dollar appreciation over much of this period would tend to
reduce the demand for U.S. exports. However, if the
estimates were subject to simultaneous equation bias,
there would be a tendency to understate the impact of
dollar appreciation in out-of-sample simulations, that is, a
tendency to overpredict exports. Thus, the underpredic-
tion in Chart 1does not appear to be the result of simulta-
neous equation bias.
15. The preceding results permit us to rule out another
explanation for the tendency to underpredict exports, the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
phenomenon of "hysteresis." Hysteresis is a situation
where a phenomenon (for example, large export volume)
persists even when the disturbance that produced it (for
example, dollar depreciation) is removed. As applied to
the present case, hysteresis would imply that sharp gains
in U.S. competitiveness after 1985 produced persistent
effects on U.S. exports that are not readily captured in
equation (1).
To understand how hysteresis in export markets may
arise, suppose that entry and exit from world export
markets is characterized by relatively high fixed costs.
One implication isthat large swings in prices may encour-
age entry or force exit, while small swings may not. Small
swings in US. competitiveness (such as those observed
up to the early 1980s)would be characterized by changes
in export demand that are well-captured by equation (1).
However, large swings in U.S. competitiveness (such as
the dollar appreciation between 1980-85 and the de-
preciation that immediately followed) would be accom-
panied by entry or exit decisions that are not easily
explained by equation (1).
Consider the trends revealed in Chart 5. The Chart
suggests that the depreciation of the dollar after 1985, in
combination with the tendency to restrain increases in the
export price, resulted in a net competitive gain for U.S.
exporters over the decade, in comparison to their indus-
trial country trading partners. Inparticular, the sharp gains
in U.S. competitiveness after 1985 were probably suffi-
ciently large to prompt the exit or deterthe entry of foreign
competitors (specifically, competitors in industrial coun-
tries). Foreign producers may have been dissuaded from
entering export markets to compete with U.S. producers
even when the dollar appreciated between 1988 and
1989, because the gains in competitiveness U.S. expor-
ters achieved earlier were not entirely eliminated. Such a
situation, where U.S. export volume remains high even if
the competitiveness of U.S.exporters is being eroded, fits
the definition of hysteresis.
However, the effects of hysteresis in explaining robust
export growth, if any, are not very strong. Otherwise, the
forecast using RXR2 should also show a persistent tend-
ency to underpredict exports in recent years.
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